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Abstract
A universal basic income (UBI) would provide all citizens with a 
guaranteed income, irrespective of their earnings, age or household 
status. It would be financed from a flat-rate personal income tax. It 
would replace the existing work-based social security system with 
its plethora of benefit types, abatement rates and eligibility rules. 
However, when the trade-offs between the competing objectives of 
a tax/benefit scheme are considered, and the variety of individual 
and family circumstances that need to be addressed, the apparent 
simplicity of a UBI quickly disappears. The article shows that while 
the current tax/benefit system represents a ‘welfare mess’, and 
needs substantial restructuring, a UBI does not necessarily provide 
an adequate income for poverty relief, nor ensure labour force 
incentives, at an acceptable fiscal cost.
Keywords  universal basic income, social security, fiscal costs, 
changing nature of work
The Universal 
Basic Income 
should it replace the  
existing social  
security system? The question raised in this article is whether a universal basic income (UBI) should replace the existing 
social security system in New Zealand. 
A UBI would provide all citizens, on 
an individual basis, with a guaranteed 
income from the state, irrespective of 
income from the labour market and 
returns on assets. It would be very 
simple in concept and design compared 
to the existing targeted social security 
system with its emphasis on workforce 
obligations, plethora of benefit types, 
benefit levels and abatement rates on 
entering work, and link between the 
family-based social security system and 
the individual-based tax system. 
To be a viable alternative to the existing 
system, the UBI would need to show that 
it would provide an adequate income for 
poverty relief; ensure labour force 
incentives; be at an acceptable fiscal cost; 
have greater political and social 
acceptance; give greater certainty of 
income; be easier to administer; be less 
stigmatising; and be flexible in relation to 
the changing patterns of work. 
Policy Quarterly – Volume 15, Issue 1 – February 2019 – Page 31
The article starts with an analysis of the 
UBI, followed by a brief discussion on the 
existing system of social security. The two 
approaches are then compared using the 
traditional trade-offs in any tax/benefit 
system between fiscal costs, benefit 
adequacy and labour force incentives. To 
this must be added the issues that underpin 
the UBI, such as the changing nature of 
work and societal relations, citizen’s rights, 
human dignity and administration costs. 
Some rough costings are given for a UBI 
based on current benefit levels.
The universal basic income
A universal basic income is a type of 
social security (and tax) system where 
all individuals would receive a minimum 
income from the state, irrespective of any 
market income assets (BIEN, n.d.; Glazer, 
2017; Standing, 2018). The pure version 
of a UBI is an unconditional flat-rate cash 
payment to all adults, and a lower flat-rate 
payment made to all dependent children. 
Neither of these payments would be added 
to taxable income. However, a UBI could 
be added to market earnings, so that 
those on higher incomes, possibly facing 
higher marginal income tax rates, would 
effectively receive less of the UBI. 
In most proposals, the UBI is to be 
financed from personal income tax, often 
levied at a flat rate. Some proposals have 
used other forms of financing, such as a 
capital gains tax, inheritance tax, a tax on 
financial transactions or a tax on land, as 
well as the reduction in existing social 
security expenditure (Morgan and Guthrie, 
2011). While the usual argument is that a 
UBI will be fiscally prohibitive, many 
evaluations of a UBI start from a revenue-
neutral stance (OECD, 2017). A UBI may 
even have a lower net fiscal cost, depending 
on the level of the UBI compared to the 
existing system, the extent to which existing 
income-tested benefits are retained, and 
the rate of personal income tax levied on 
additional earnings. 
An alternative approach, favoured by 
libertarians, is a negative income tax. While 
the mechanics of a negative income tax are 
the same as the taxed version of the UBI 
(Mendelson, 2016), it has a different 
philosophical pedigree, based on workforce 
participation. It would be paid selectively 
via a tax credit, through income testing, to 
those with lower levels of market income. 
Several US states introduced well-evaluated 
trials of such schemes in the 1970s, with 
mixed results in terms of workforce 
participation, poverty relief, health status, 
quality of life, educational attainment and 
fiscal costs. Atkinson (1996) argued for a 
‘participation income’, where ‘the basic 
income would be paid conditional on 
participation’. Participation covers not just 
labour market activity, including active job 
search, but also voluntary work, child and 
elder care and education. This would be an 
extension of the social security system – a 
guaranteed minimum income.
A distinction is made between a full and 
a partial basic income. A full UBI would be 
financed from general tax revenue and 
would largely replace the existing social 
security system and other redistributive 
measures. A partial UBI is a demogrant 
paid to all in society, funded from a windfall 
source of revenue such as casinos, oil 
revenue or carbon tax. It is not a 
replacement for the existing social security 
system and is not considered further here 
(Piachaud, 2016). 
Rationale for a UBI
The literature provides many rationales 
for a UBI. Most start from a notion of 
citizenship, in that we all contribute to 
society from a variety of perspectives, 
and thus are entitled to the fruits of 
our participation in society. Most also 
note the change in the employment 
relationship since the development 
of social security: a shift to a service 
economy; the potential impact of changes 
in technology, especially robotics, on 
work; the casualisation of work from 
short-term contracts; increased part-
time and part-year work; and irregular 
work hours. Societal changes include 
sole parenting and reconstituted families, 
and the increased incidence, severity and 
intergenerational persistence of poverty, 
as well as greater income and asset 
inequality. 
Critics of the UBI argue that it breaks 
the unwritten social contract on reciprocity 
and mutual obligations that underpins 
society. Paying a benefit for the voluntary 
leisure of Surfer Jill certainly breaks the 
immediacy of that reciprocity. However, 
the social contract can be intra- or 
intergenerational, with paid employment 
or unpaid childcare or voluntary work at 
one point in time and unconditional 
receipt of a benefit at another. New Zealand 
Superannuation is thus a form of UBI, with 
contributions during one’s working life and 
receipt of a pension post the age of 65 (see 
Davey and Stephens, 2018). Equally, a 
universal child allowance, especially for 
children under age five, has a similar 
generational aspect: the majority of child 
development occurs in the early stages of 
life, and that development – and thus 
future outcomes – is affected by the level 
of family income. 
The structure of a universal basic income
Figure 1 outlines the basic structure of a 
UBI and personal income tax system, and 
also a negative income tax. The horizontal 
axis covers all sources of market income 
before tax is levied – wages and salaries, and 
income from assets such as dividends and 
rental property. The vertical axis covers the 
UBI, and then adjusts only market income 
for personal income tax and any receipt 
of benefits or tax credits – i.e. disposable 
income after taxes and benefits. Tax is paid 
on the first dollar of market earnings, and 
in Figure 1 there is a single tax rate. N=M 
Most [UBI literature] start from a notion 
of citizenship, in that we all contribute 
to society from a variety of perspectives, 
and thus are entitled to the fruits of our 
participation in society. 
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represents the situation where no personal 
income tax is levied or benefit received. As 
market earnings increase, net disposable 
income rises along the line DZF (market 
earnings, less tax, plus the UBI). The fiscal 
cost of the UBI is DFO, suitably adjusted 
for the distribution of income. At F the tax 
on market earnings just equals receipt of 
the UBI. 
A potentially less fiscally expensive 
approach would be to add the UBI to 
market earnings. While the gross UBI is 
still paid to all members of society, the net 
UBI would be OE, with the difference 
between OD and OE being based on the 
tax rate. Disposable income after tax is 
then EG, and net fiscal costs are EGO. At 
G, the tax-abated UBI just equals the tax 
paid. Positive tax payments start at G, or 
market earnings of OA. The net fiscal 
costs also require knowledge of the 
number of people at each point on the 
pre-tax earnings axis.
The same outcome as with the earnings-
abated UBI is achieved by the negative 
income tax approach, with those below 
income OA receiving a tax credit, with the 
maximum tax credit, and thus minimum 
income level, being OE. The net fiscal cost 
to the government is again EGO. In both 
scenarios, the tax rate is progressive in that 
the average tax rate rises with income, even 
though the marginal tax rate is flat. 
The above discussion indicates some of 
the issues that any UBI has to resolve:
•	 What	should	be	the	unit	of	assessment:	
the individual, the couple, or the family 
with dependent children?
•	 What	eligibility	criteria	should	be	used,	
in particular residency requirements?
•	 Should	 the	 UBI	 be	 added	 to	 other	
income for tax purposes, or be 
unconditional and thus tax free?
•	 Should	 all	 those	 eligible	 receive	 the	
same amount, given differences in 
family circumstances?
•	 At	what	income	level	should	the	UBI	
be set? Should the UBI be designed to 
avoid poverty, or set at a lower level and 
rely on income-tested supplementary 
payments to recognise differences in 
need?
•	 To	 what	 extent	 will	 the	 UBI	 be	 a	
replacement for the existing social 
security system, or a supplement to it?
•	 Are	incentives	to	work	and	save	relevant	
considerations, or are the objectives just 
citizenship, dignity and human rights?
•	 How	can	the	UBI	be	made	flexible	in	
relation to changing economic and 
social conditions, such as different 
family circumstances, especially in 
regard to care of dependent children, 
changing social attitudes and 
differences in the nature of work and 
employment?
The existing social security system
The current social security system is 
strongly work-contingent. There are two 
major benefit types: jobseeker support 
and supported living payment benefit, 
with benefit levels set related to workforce 
expectations rather than need. Those on 
jobseeker support have to be available 
for full-time work, with strict sanctions 
whereby benefit levels can be cut by half for 
non-compliance. Those on the supported 
living payment (temporary ill-health, sole 
parent, injury or disability) have a part-
time work or work preparation obligation. 
There is also a family tax credit for families 
on benefits or low incomes, and an in-
work benefit dependent upon workforce 
participation. There are targeted second-
tier benefits for housing and childcare, 
where family needs vary on a systematic 
basis, and a discretionary third tier based 
on specific circumstances, such as disability, 
residential care or to offset one-off needs.1 
The benefit level for those on the 
supported living payment is significantly 
higher than for those on jobseeker support: 
e.g., using April 2018 rates, a couple on the 
supported living payment will receive $448 
per week, whereas a jobseeker would 
receive $358. This difference also applies 
to those with children: $474 compared to 
$384, and for a sole parent with one child 
$379 compared to $334. Benefit abatement 
rates also differ, with jobseeker support 
having a 70 cents in the dollar abatement 
on income over $80 gross per week, while 
those on the supported living payment can 
receive up to $100 per week before benefit 
abatement begins, at 30% up to $200 per 
week, and thereafter at 70%. Personal 
income tax is also levied on any earnings. 
The lower benefit level, lower abatement 
threshold and higher abatement rate for 
jobseeker support are meant to provide a 
greater incentive to move into the full-time 
labour force. Child assistance has an 
abatement rate of 25% above a threshold 
of $42,700. 
As Figure 2 shows, the result of this 
system is a very complex array of effective 
marginal (and average) tax rates (Nolan, 
2018). And this does not take into account 
the impact of abatement rates for the 
accommodation supplement or childcare 
allowances, nor issues arising from 
changing family circumstances, or 
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movements in and out of work (tax is 
based on annual income, benefits on 
income over the last fortnight). The 
components of disposable income are 
shown, with market income increasing 
with hours of work, the main benefit 
abating with income as well as family 
assistance tax credits. 
The dark black line is the effective 
marginal tax rates (EMTRs), with only 
personal income tax levied on earnings 
until the abatement threshold of $100 a 
week is reached. After that threshold, 
benefit abatement of 30%, plus personal 
income tax of 17.5%, gives a total EMTR 
of 48.9% (includes ACC levy of 1.4%). 
After $200 earnings per week, or 12 hours 
of work, the benefit abates at 70%, and 
personal income tax and ACC levies put 
up the EMTR to 88.9%. But at 17 hours of 
work the level of the main benefit has fallen, 
so that a lower personal income tax applies. 
At 20 hours of work the sole parent 
becomes eligible for the minimum family 
tax credit, giving a boost in net income and 
thus lower average tax rate, but the 
minimum family tax credit is abated at 
100% until it is exhausted – hardly an 
encouragement to work for longer than 20 
hours. Only after 35 hours does the EMTR 
fall so that only the personal income tax 
rate applies, and disposable income 
increases. If wage rates are higher, the 
segments both prior to and after the 20-
hour threshold are shortened. 
Criteria for evaluation
As the comparison between Figures 1 and 
2 shows, the existing social security system 
is very complex compared to the apparent 
simplicity of a UBI. The eligibility rules for 
social security do not provide certainty of 
income, nor human dignity and social 
rights. However, part of the complexity 
of the existing system results from taking 
account of the likely permutations of 
need, which vary not just by income level 
but also by family type and size, housing 
location and tenure, workforce eligibility 
and expectations, and need for additional 
(and discretionary) disability allowances 
and one-off expenditures that the basic 
benefit is not designed to cover. 
Economic analysis of the welfare system, 
and political mandates, concentrate on the 
trade-offs that occur between minimising 
the fiscal costs of the programme, providing 
positive labour supply incentives by both 
the provision of a benefit and its abatement 
on entering the workforce, and the 
alleviation of income poverty2 – the ‘iron 
triangle’ (Stephens, 1997). These trade-offs 
have to be made by any social security 
system, including the UBI. The UBI draws 
attention to the complexity of the existing 
system and gives different weightings to 
the components of the iron triangle, and 
adds further criteria for evaluation. The 
issue is thus whether a UBI would, 
compared to the existing tax/benefit 
system: reduce stigma from a lack of 
income; provide greater certainty of 
income; reduce compliance and 
administration costs; provide adequate 
incentive effects for labour force 
participation and savings; ensure relief 
from income poverty; be affordable in 
terms of tax levels; and be flexible in 
relation to changing patterns of work.
Human dignity and citizen’s rights
Human dignity, income certainty, and the 
right to a share of the wealth and income 
from societal production are the essence of 
the UBI. Apart from an initial application, 
people will be automatically eligible for 
the UBI, and probably most secondary 
or second-tier benefits, resulting in high 
take-up rates, giving income certainty. A 
UBI overcomes the demeaning nature of a 
targeted welfare system, with its emphasis 
on work incentives and encouragement 
and enforcement, and will provide some 
minimum income guarantee in periods 
of need, especially in periods of transition 
in and out of employment. Take-up rates 
for receipt of the UBI should be very 
high, whereas take-up rates for income-
tested benefits, especially second- and 
third-tier benefits, tends to be fairly low: 
UK estimates of less than 50% have been 
recorded (Eardley et al., 1996). 
The current social security system is the 
antithesis of human dignity, with detailed 
and intrusive application forms, repeat 
visits to Work and Income offices, 
monitoring of work applications, threats 
of and actual reductions to benefits because 
of non-compliance with complex rules, 
and in some cases an apparent lack of 
compassion at the front desk. Stigma 
attaches to receipt of a benefit. Benefit 
income is not assured, given stand-down 
periods which apply when moving into 
unemployment, or the income gap between 
entering work and the first pay cheque. 
Chapple (2018) argues that the 2011 social 
investment welfare reforms provided 
perverse incentives by imposing higher 
surveillance and information costs on 
legitimately eligible beneficiaries, as well as 
encouraging benefit exit, but not necessarily 
to a well-paid job, or even a job. 
Administration and compliance costs
These are an automatic part of operating 
any tax and benefit system. Administration 
costs are incurred by the government in 
operating and delivering transfer payments, 
obtaining tax revenue, and ensuring 
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compliance with tax and social security 
legislation. Compliance costs are incurred 
by taxpayers and benefit recipients, and 
include monetary, time and psychological 
costs of filling in tax forms, or stigma from 
applying for benefits. Minimising total 
costs should be the aim. Administration 
costs can be shifted to compliance costs 
by requiring, for example, employers 
to calculate the appropriate amount for 
family tax credits or deductions of tax 
liabilities at source. 
The use of the current pay-as-you-earn 
tax system should address some of the 
concerns about integrating the tax and UBI 
systems. Costs of transitioning to a UBI 
should be low, as the design issues are 
relatively straightforward. There is one 
application form for each individual, and 
the current tax deductions at source can 
be used to assess market income. 
Complications arising from any need for 
targeted second- and third-tier benefits will 
add to costs, but the UK universal credit 
model (Economist, 2018) may provide 
guidance. There will still be a need for 
administration expenditures to minimise 
tax avoidance and evasion, but a UBI 
should reduce the opportunities for benefit 
fraud. In contrast, the existing system, with 
its complex entitlement rules, several 
benefit levels, abatement of the first- and 
second-tier benefits and family assistance, 
at different levels of income and effective 
tax rates, plus turnover of the case load and 
enforcement of work search requirements, 
all lead to high administration costs.
The iron triangle – fiscal costs, labour force 
incentives and poverty relief
Returning to the iron triangle mentioned 
above, the UBI brings these trade-offs 
into stark relief, showing how these three 
objectives cannot be simultaneously 
achieved, irrespective of the parameters 
of the income maintenance system. 
In Figure 3, the income-based poverty 
level has been set at OP, while the value of 
the UBI or jobseeker support is OE, below 
the poverty level. The poverty level has 
been adjusted, through the use of 
equivalence scales, for the number (and 
age) of children, with the disposable 
income level ET adjusted for any financial 
assistance provided. The fiscal costs are the 
triangle OEG, with many of the now non-
poor (AB) receiving income not solely 
needed to avoid income poverty. The direct 
fiscal cost is also determined by the number 
of people at each point in the pre-tax 
income distribution. The provision of the 
UBI has lowered the number in poverty 
from OB, based on market income, to OA, 
giving a relatively small reduction in the 
incidence of poverty. However, if the 
measure of effectiveness is the severity of 
poverty – or the extent to which people fall 
below the poverty level – the UBI/jobseeker 
support is far more effective, reducing the 
size of the poverty gap from OPX to EPT.
Reducing the incidence and severity of 
poverty requires raising the level of the 
UBI/jobseeker support to, say, OF. The 
extra fiscal cost could be reduced by a 
higher EMTR, giving FT, with no reduction 
in the incidence of poverty, although the 
severity of poverty is reduced. Retaining 
the original tax rate would increase fiscal 
costs significantly. Eliminating spillover of 
fiscal costs to the non-poor could be 
achieved by having a UBI/jobseeker 
support of OP, which would eliminate the 
incidence and severity of poverty. However, 
it would require a 100% EMTR over the 
market earnings range OA, giving no 
incentives to enter the labour market for 
those with likely market earnings below 
OA. This lack of incentive to enter work is 
the concern of those opposed to a UBI.
In other words, the higher the UBI/
jobseeker support for poverty relief, the 
larger the fiscal cost; to reduce the fiscal 
cost, either the basic benefit has to be lower, 
increasing the incidence of poverty, or 
EMTRs have to be higher, giving more 
adverse labour supply incentive effects. 
Retaining labour supply incentives requires 
a lower EMTR, with the likely impact of 
less poverty relief and/or greater fiscal costs 
from a higher level of spillover of benefits 
to the non-poor. The choice is based not 
just on the direct parameters of the UBI or 
jobseeker support, as both systems will 
probably require use of income-tested 
second- and third-tier benefits if poverty 
relief is to be provided, increasing fiscal 
costs and adverse labour supply incentives 
from higher EMTRs. Raising benefit levels, 
or the UBI, is the most certain way of 
reducing income poverty for those out of 
work, while increasing the generosity of 
family assistance benefits will be a cost-
effective way of reducing child poverty. 
Fiscal costs
Very rough estimates can be made of the 
fiscal costs of a UBI. All of these estimates 
indicate either a substantial increase in 
expenditure on social welfare, and/or 
greater poverty for current recipients of 
benefits. These costs vary according to 
the level of the weekly payment, the tax 
rate and who is covered, but ignoring any 
labour market incentives. The current 
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Figure 3: Poverty Relief, Fiscal Costs and Labour Incentives
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(2018) expenditure estimates for Social 
Development are $20bn, of which $13.7bn 
is for New Zealand Superannuation. Total 
core tax revenue is roughly $70bn, with 
personal income tax roughly $20bn. Even 
using the jobseeker payments, and lowest 
child assistance expenditures, the fiscal 
cost of a UBI would be $45.5bn, or roughly 
two thirds of all tax revenue, and more 
than double the existing expenditure on 
social security benefits.
•	 If	the	UBI	is	set	for	all	persons	aged	18+	
at the jobseeker support level of $215 
per week, then the total cost for 3.7 
million people would be $41.3bn. 
•	 To	this	should	be	added	the	payment	
per child for those receiving benefits: 
$5,875pa for the first child or $4,745 
for second and subsequent children. 
Using the first child allowance for all 
children would raise expenditure by a 
further $6.2bn, and $4.2bn if the 
second child rate is used. 
•	 If	the	UBI	is	set	at	the	supported	living	
payment rate for all aged 18+, the total 
cost rises to $51.8bn, plus the child 
allowance payment.
•	 If	the	UBI	is	set	at	the	existing	New	
Zealand Superannuation level for a 
single person of $400 per week, the 
fiscal cost would rise to roughly $74bn, 
plus the child allowance payments.
•	 If	the	UBI	is	restricted	just	to	those	aged	
18–64, at the jobseeker rate the cost 
would be $34.4bn, plus the child 
allowance of $4.2bn, plus the existing 
pension costs of $13.7bn.
•	 If	the	UBI	is	paid	to	those	aged	18–64	
at the supported living payment rate, 
the cost would be $41.9bn, again with 
child and pension payments.
•	 If	revenue	neutrality	is	desired,	then	the	
existing fiscal cost of the current social 
security and pension scheme has to be 
distributed across all members of 
society. If we assume that there is no 
change in the amount spent on children 
under age 18, then there is 
approximately $20bn for the 
population of 3.7 million people aged 
18 and over. The resulting UBI would 
be only $104 per person. 
In all these cases, significant spending 
on second- and third-tier benefits would 
be required to reduce the high poverty level 
that would ensue, increasing total fiscal 
costs. Other options are a substantial 
increase in tax levels or cuts to government 
expenditure, especially on social services 
such as health, education and housing, 
reducing the real value of the UBI.
Labour supply incentives
The ability to finance either a UBI or the 
current social security system depends 
upon the tax base, which is a function 
of both the tax rate and the number of 
taxpayers with market earnings in each 
tax bracket. The imposition of a tax, and 
the provision of a benefit, can affect the 
number of taxpayers and their level of 
market earnings – i.e. labour supply 
incentive effects. 
However, other factors may 
predominate. Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1991) indicate that entitlement conditions 
and case management rules may be the 
more important determinants of labour 
supply. Positive encouragement, such as 
training and education, or working with 
employers to encourage them to accept 
those with a disability or released from 
prison, help overcome disadvantages in 
participation and are more likely to lead to 
primary jobs at decent wages, with a lower 
likelihood of return to unemployment. But 
the UBI, by ignoring this contingent 
information, treats all recipients identically 
and does not take account of these 
differential potential impacts on labour 
supply, and thus the possibility of 
improving the trade-off between fiscal 
costs, poverty relief and labour supply 
incentives. Nevertheless, a UBI does allow 
job experimentation, and time for study 
and to undertake child or elder care, 
without the risks of sanctions and stand-
down periods. 
The decision to enter the workforce is 
traditionally seen as dependent upon the 
replacement rate – the level of benefit when 
out of work compared to the expected level 
of earnings in employment. A higher UBI 
or benefit level is less likely to encourage 
work effort. However, a UBI provides 
limited disincentive to enter work as the 
EMTR on any earnings is only based on 
the structure of the tax rates for the total 
population. For the existing social security 
system, Figure 2 shows that EMTRs are 
effectively U-shaped, with high rates as 
benefits are abated, before falling when 
earnings are beyond the abatement 
thresholds. The resulting structure of 
EMTRs can be seen as an attempt to 
encourage either very limited part-time 
work or full-time work, as there is virtually 
no financial gain from working at a modest 
level of employment. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that the 
disincentive to enter work is larger for 
women than for men, especially with a 
family-based benefit system. When a 
partner enters the labour force, benefits 
which are abated against family income 
tend to show a limited gain in cash income. 
Browne and Immervoll (2018) argue that 
as a UBI is not withdrawn when people 
start earning more, work incentives are 
strengthened. Much of the evidence 
suggests that most people want to work, 
and the biggest constraint is the availability 
of suitable employment, at adequate wages 
in preferred locations. The few experiments 
with forms of a UBI/negative income tax, 
such as the Denver/Seattle experiment and 
that in Canada, have shown a slight 
reduction in hours of work rather than 
withdrawal from the labour market, 
though there were bigger reductions for 
wives and single mothers. More importantly, 
there was an improvement in quality of life, 
teens stayed in high school longer, many 
women took longer maternity leave, and 
The UBI does highlight many of the 
problems facing the current social 
security system, and thus provides an 
outline for how that system can be 
improved.
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there was improved mental and physical 
health and reduced criminal activity 
(Glazer, 2017). 
Fairness and equity
Political acceptability requires that 
taxes and benefits are seen to be fair or 
equitable. Tax avoidance and evasion and 
benefit fraud break this societal norm of 
fairness. Resentment over benefit receipt 
often comes from (low-income) workers 
and taxpayers. This resentment is likely to 
be high for UBI payments to those not in 
need.
An intergenerational perspective may 
yield different answers, however. The 
perceived fairness of the UBI may depend 
on whether those with no current market 
income will make or have made a positive 
contribution to society. Surfer Jill or Idler 
Joe may not be making a current 
contribution to society, but the time off 
with some security of income may allow 
them to adjust to changing personal 
circumstances before re-entering the 
labour market, or doing further education/
training or voluntary work. 
A universal child benefit might be more 
acceptable. Wages are set on economic 
rather than social bases (so do not adjust 
for family size), children cost money 
irrespective of income levels, and child 
development represents the future of the 
economy. As much of child development 
occurs before age five (Expert Advisory 
Group on Solutions to Child Poverty, 2012) 
and this is the age when family incomes 
are at their lowest, a strong case can be 
made for universal family assistance for all 
children under five. There is still the issue 
of how to decide which parent should 
receive the child assistance, given the 
individual nature of the UBI. Universal 
child assistance would overcome many of 
the labour market incentive issues that 
arise from the high EMTRs in the existing 
targeted system.
Conclusions
A UBI is seductively simple. Many 
proponents of a UBI look at it de novo, or 
having a blank sheet for the tax–benefit 
interface. But it will be a replacement for 
the existing social security system and will 
have to face the same issues and people. 
The UBI does highlight many of the 
problems facing the current social security 
system, and thus provides an outline for 
how that system can be improved. It does 
not resolve the fundamental trade-offs in 
the iron triangle – the incompatibility of 
achieving labour force incentives, poverty 
relief and low fiscal costs at the same time. 
Nor does it achieve administrative gains, 
as some forms of supplementary and 
income-tested benefit will be needed to 
mitigate the constraints of the iron triangle.
The existing social security system does 
have significant problems. But some of 
these could be addressed by reprioritising 
the existing system rather than moving to 
a UBI. The UK universal credit evaluations 
should be monitored to see whether an 
automatic and integrated payment 
approach based on income and social 
characteristics is a suitable vehicle for 
addressing some of the failings of the 
current system. This approach would 
provide some form of guaranteed 
minimum income, but without spilling 
over into the total population.
With a UBI, while the workforce 
disincentives from high EMTRs are 
partially addressed, there are few 
mechanisms to ensure employment and 
thus the tax base. Other policy instruments 
may be more appropriate: full employment 
at adequate wages; workforce 
encouragement through removal of 
constraints on entering the labour market, 
such as lack of appropriate skills; offsetting 
adverse backgrounds such as prison history, 
tattoos, drugs, etc.; and lifelong training 
opportunities for re-education. The 
automatic payment of a UBI fails to 
address any of these issues. 
Admittedly, the welfare state has not 
adjusted well to the changing nature of 
work, which is becoming more transient 
and precarious. It has used enforcement 
and punitive sanctions to fit people into 
the changing world, rather than providing 
encouragement to offset barriers to work. 
Once again, though, the UBI is a panacea, 
not a realistic solution to these problems. 
More generally, as Timmins has 
commented, there is 
a key trade-off in the design of any 
system of social security: the simpler it 
is, the more it will involve forms of 
rough social justice; the more attuned 
it is to individual need, the more 
complicated it will be, both for 
claimants and for those running it. 
(Timmins, 2018, p.8)
The proponents of the UBI have yet to 
show how it can be adjusted to take account 
of individual need. Therefore, we may be 
better off looking to simplify and amend 
the current system, to make it fit better 
with the realities of the 21st century. 
1 Boston (forthcoming) lists over 60 benefit types, each with 
their own criteria for eligibility. 
2 There is no single way to measure poverty, nor to update 
any poverty line that has been established. For a detailed 
discussion on the different ways to measure poverty, and 
how to set an appropriate level for the poverty line and how 
it can be adjusted for differences in family structure and size, 
see Madden (2015), Expert Advisory Group on Solutions 
to Child Poverty (2012) and Perry (2017). Income poverty 
rather than standards of living are used, as variations in 
income is the policy parameter appropriate for the iron 
triangle. In New Zealand, income poverty measures are 
usually based on either a relative measure of 50% or 60% 
of median household disposable income, adjusted for family 
size and composition, or an absolute measure where an 
income poverty measure (50% or 60%) set at one point in 
time is adjusted by the consumers price index rather than 
movements in median income. 
Atkinson, A. (1996) ‘The case for a participation income’, Political 
Quarterly, 67 (1), pp.67–70
Atkinson, A. and J. Micklewright (1991) ‘Unemployment compensation 
and labour market transitions: a critical review’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 29 (4), pp.1679–727
BIEN (n.d.) ‘About basic income’, https://basicincome.org/basic-income/
Boston, J. (forthcoming) Transforming the Welfare State, Wellington: 
Bridget Williams Books
Browne, J. and H. Immervoll (2017) Basic Income as a Policy Option: 
technical note illustrating costs and distributional implications for 
selected countries, Paris: OECD Publishing
Chapple, S. (2018) ‘Under and over the benefit in NZ’, Newsroom, 14 
February, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/@future-
learning/2018/02/13/88629/under-and-over-the-benefit-in-nz
Davey, J. and R. Stephens (2018) ‘New Zealand retirement income policy 
as an eco-system’, Policy Quarterly, 14 (3), pp.86–91
References
The Universal Basic Income: should it replace the existing social security system?
Policy Quarterly – Volume 15, Issue 1 – February 2019 – Page 37
Eardley, T., J. Bradshaw, J. Ditch, I. Gough and P. Whiteford (1996) Social 
Assistance Schemes in the OECD Countries: the synthesis report, 
Department of Social Security research report 46, London: HMSO
Economist (2018) ‘Universal credit: the new safety net’, 2 June 
Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty (2012) Solutions to 
Child Poverty in New Zealand: evidence for action, Wellington: Office of 
the Children’s Commissioner
EGlazer, S. (2017) ‘Universal basic income: would cash payments relieve 
job losses due to automation?, CQ Researcher, 8 September
Madden, K. (2015) The Heart of Poverty: defining and measuring what it 
means to be poor in New Zealand, Auckland: Maxim Institute
Mendelson, M. (2016) ‘“Basic income” or “bait and switch”?’, Caledon 
Commentary, Toronto: Caledon Institute of Social Policy
Morgan, G. and S. Guthrie (2011) The Big Kahuna: turning tax and welfare 
in New Zealand on its head, Wellington: Morgan Foundation
Nolan, P. (2018) Effective Marginal Tax Rates: the New Zealand case, 
working paper 2018/01, Wellington: New Zealand Productivity 
Commission
OECD (2017) ‘Basic income as a policy option’, policy brief on the future 
of work, Paris: OECD
Perry, B. (2017) Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators 
in inequality and hardship, 1982–2016, Wellington: Ministry of Social 
Development
Piachaud, D. (2016) Citizen’s Incomes: rights and wrongs, CASE/200, 
London: London School of Economics
Standing, G. (2018) Basic Income: and how we can make it happen, 
London: Pelican Books
Stephens, R. (1997) ‘The interaction and coordination of taxation and 
expenditure programs’, in R. Krever (ed.), Tax Conversations: a guide to 
the key issues in the tax reform debate, London: Kluwer Law 
International
Timmins, N. (2018) Universal Credit: from disaster to recovery?, London: 
Institute for Government
Mountains to Sea
Solving New Zealand’s Freshwater Crisis   Edited by Mike Joy
It strikes me with great clarity that if you look at the problems 
in isolation they each seem intractable; but when you grasp 
that there could be one single solution, then suddenly there  
is a glimpse of light at the end of the tunnel. 
The state of New Zealand’s freshwater has 
become a pressing public issue in recent years. 
From across the political spectrum, concern is 
growing about the pollution of New Zealand’s 
rivers and streams. We all know they need 
fixing. But how do we do it?
In Mountains to Sea, leading ecologist Mike 
Joy teams up with thinkers from all walks of life 
to consider how we can solve New Zealand’s 
fresh water crisis. The book covers a wide 
range of topics, including food production, 
public health, economics and Māori narratives 
of water. Mountains to Sea offers new 
perspectives on this urgent problem.
Contributors: Mike Joy, Tina Ngata,  
Nick D. Kim, Vanessa Hammond, Paul Tapsell 
and Alison Dewes, Peter Fraser, Kyleisha Foote, 
Catherine Knight, Steven Carden and Phil 
McKenzie, and Chris Perley
Buy from good New Zealand bookshops or online at  
www.bwb.co.nz
BRIDGET WILLIAMS BOOKS
Paperback $14.99 | ebook $4.99 | ISBN 9781988545431
